This lecture aimed to create a bridge to span the conceptual and ideological gap between randomised controlled trials and systematic observational comparisons and to reduce unwanted and unproductive polarisation. The argument, simply put, is that since randomisation alone eliminates the selection effect of therapeutic decision making, anything short of randomisation to attribute cause to consequent outcome is a waste of time. If observational comparison does have any significant part in evaluating medical outcomes, there is a grave danger of "the best", to paraphrase Voltaire, becoming "the enemy of the good". The first section aims to emphasise the advantages of randomised controlled trials. Then the nature of an essential precondition -medical uncertainty -is discussed in terms of its extent and effect. Next, the role of patient choice in medical decision making is considered, both when outcomes can safely be attributed to treatment choice and when they cannot. There may be many important situations in which choice itself affects outcome and this could mean that random comparisons give biased estimates of true therapeutic effects. In the penultimate section, the implications of this possibility both for randomised controlled trials and for outcome research is pursued and lastly there are some simple recommendations for reliable outcome research.
Archie Cochrane's great contribution to our discipline in 1972 was to describe a most important problem in health care and to posit a satisfactory solution. In his biography,' he says of his work on Effectiveness and Efficiency2:
"I decided to concentrate on one simple idea -the value of the randomised controlled trials in improving the NHS -and to keep the book short and simple." He did so in a manner which rings as loud and clear today as it did then. Nowadays, both the problem and solution are very familiar to us all. The problem was that much of the health care provided was unevaluated, and therefore possibly of no benefit, and the solutionrandomised controlled trials -were the only secure way of knowing the truth of the matter.
Cochrane's essential idea was that the reliable assessment of effectiveness was the only key to scientific health care, but such methods as he advocated had been disparaged by the medical establishment -paradoxically because they seemed to be less scientific than the more traditional basic methods of scientific evaluation. A problem of methodological imperialism which is with us still, but in different guise?
He argued forcibly that only when the effectiveness of a treatment or preventive measure had been established and quantified, could the issues of efficiency and equity be discussed intelligently. But in the absence of reliable information about effectiveness, the pursuit of optimal health policies was bound to be permanently elusive.
Since I believe, lead to an unnecessary prolongation of medical uncertainties. The issues are too important in my view.
(1) The value of randomised controlled trials Since the publication of Effectiveness and Efficiency2 there have been several attempts to minimise or falsify the importance and relevance of Cochrane's message. Each succeeds only in accentuating its importance. It is impossible nowadays to deny the requirements for serious research on outcomes, but the gap between true knowledge of outcomes and the need to know and to understand, and hence to meet these requirements, remains large.
What was most important in 1972, and still is for us now, is how to bridge that gap. Last year Iain Chalmers gave a masterful demonstration of the practical extrapolation from Cochrane himself to the Cochrane Centre, clearly a central part of the "outcomes movement". This evolved from the National Perinatal Epidemiology Unit and took on the work of Iain, Richard Peto, Rory Collins, and others in summing the results of randomised trials of treatment. There is no question in my mind that these efforts in understanding the effectiveness of treatments, and hence helping people choose between options, are of enormous value. For me, the most exciting has been the work on breast cancer treatment.4 The increasing use of randomised comparisons in judging effectiveness is wholly appropriate and must go much further.
IMPEDIMENTS
I want to leave aside, for the moment, the extent of the importance of uncertainty in health care decision making, and examine briefly part of the existing resistance to the use of randomised controlled trials. Cochrane discussed impediments to the wider acceptance of these in practice. There are three basic reasons for not carrying out randomised controlled trials where uncertainty exists:
(1) Ethical objection (?) (2) Lack of objective outcome measures (3) The resistance of those "threatened" by randomised controlled trials.
THE ARGUMENTS
We must be clear about the basic arguments, because in advocating greater, more systematic, and rigorous use of observational methods5 in judging efficacy (as I shall be doing later) it is very easy to associate oneself with a camp one does not wish to be associated with. There have been many exponents of the view, encapsulated by Feinstein, 6 that "Causeeffect can be evaluated observationally" is scientific heresy only if two cogent scientific realities are ignored -the first, that some things are not amenable to experimental intervention, and the second, that randomised controlled trials are too expensive, too difficult, or too controversial. Whether or not such notions derive from feeling threatened is of secondary importance only, but they are common.
Of course trials are expensive and difficult, but from a cost effective point of view they can be much more readily justified because they provide hard unbiased evidence about the relative effectiveness of common, important, and expensive treatments. It is absolutely no part of my argument to disparage randomised comparisons at all -least of all because they are too expensive or complicated. The end justifies the means most of the time. To accept these kind of arguments is really to suggest that some alternative is generally better and that somehow it does not matter, because it is inevitable, that most treatments will not be evaluated by randomised comparisons.
Feinstein and others (Colin Dollery, for example, in his Rock Carling lecture7) assert that most treatments will be assessed by a mixture of insight, theory, acumen, and uncontrolled observation. Of course large effects can be reliably detected like that, but from now on I will be discussing uncertainties over small but important effect differences in common medical practices which are poorly understood and are simply not amenable to evaluation in this way.
There is a more extreme current ideawhich is just plain wrong -and this is that the use of databases which record everything about patients can easily, as a consequence of recording everything, be used to adjust for all confounders and then compare treatments as if there had been no selection.8 This has to be dismissed as ridiculous. Unknown and unsuspected confounding is mostly important and always elusive. The great idea of Fisher and Bradford Hill, so ably developed by many, including Archie Cochrane, is one of the few panaceas of our time. In the context of medical interventions, the essence of the argument has been repeatedly put by David Byer.' He says that "Epidemiology is an essential discipline . . . for assessing the importance of exposures ... there is a disassociation between the reason for exposure and the outcome. On the other hand, in medicine, the doctor chooses the therapy precisely to affect the outcome and for no other reason". Archie's view was most succinctly put, and poignant nonetheless: "Observational evidence is clearly better than opinion but it is thoroughly unsatisfactory". (3) Studying medical uncertainty As I will discuss later, the nature of the existence of medical uncertainty is complicated because on the whole it is disparaged. Medical teachers do not like it, for obvious reasons, and does not budge an inch in the direction of recognising any uncertainties whatsoever:
"The fact that a recent review has suggested that TURP may not be as good as urologists have claimed does not detract from the important advantages of this technique in treating benign prostatic hyperplasia".
A wonderful quote which manages to dismiss the finding completely by calling it a "review" and then attributing a mere suggestion to that review. The important "advantages" of transuretheral prostatectomy suggested by the data from a complete enumeration of all prostatectomy patients in three databases are an excess in one year mortality of around 40%. Of course, since the data are inconclusive and inconvenient they can be ignored, while inconclusive and convenient, but almost all small, selected, uncontrolled case series, can be cited, essentially as established. This surely ought not to happen.
WHAT DOES THE DIFFERENCE MEAN?
One is, of course, left wondering whether the observed difference in the databases is attributable to the operation type, for there are many plausible explanations for the transuretheral prostatectomy really having a higher risk of mortality. These are mostly concerned with hypothermia associated with unheated irrigation fluid, for instance, or the nature of the irrigation fluid itself. The results of the only randomised study22 is interesting because it is consistent with an increased mortality. The five year mortality was 21% in the transuretheral prostatectomy group and only 6% in the open prostatectomy group, however, the numbers were very small, some 40 in the transuretheral prostatectomy group and 30 in the other. A question we are left with is the extent to which consumers of this kind of health care would, given all the evidence outlined above, actually choose a transuretheral prostatectomy in preference to an open operation.
(4) The role of patient choices in decision making In deciding upon an appropriate medical or surgical treatment the choice obviously ought to be determined by the probabilities of particular outcomes associated with each choice, combined with the individual preferences for those outcomes. Where there is uncertainty about the true size of these probabilities, the procedure is complicated, not least because of the demonstrated placebo effect of medical certainty. That is to say, the paternalistic doctor may actually be doing his (gender chosen advisedly) patients more good than one who expresses the uncertainties honestly. So perhaps the above editorial in the British Medical 7ournalP is dedicated only to making patients with benign hypertrophy of the prostate better -who would otherwise not improve if they suspected that the treatment could possibly have a significant downside. I will pursue some of the implications of this below. Most often the nature of the therapeutic choice is not about which procedure, but is with the timing and whether to do something or not; it is a threshold question, which dominates much of the variation in observed rates (see fig 4) . It is simple to demonstrate that quite small differences in the threshold of signs or symptoms at which intervention happens on average can be responsible for dramatic differences in the rates of intervention. By the nature of the problem these differences in treatment policy are seldom assessed unbiasedly by randomised comparison; partly because the uncertainties are not sufficiently stark and partly because consumer choice is (often illegitimately23) cited as the driving force behind the decision. But the cost differences are often enormous.
The nature of the choices can be illuminated by using the methodologies in section (3), and sometimes it can be seen that the medical certainties are based on implausible theory. Rarely can the demonstration be sufficiently convincing to cause appropriate randomised comparison, however. As was shown above if vested interests do not want to believe plaus- But the alternative to not trying to investigate this phenomenon is, it seems to me, to deny its existence, and there is too much of that going on already. It seems quite plausible that for some conditions this will be important and for others utterly irrelevant, but it would be good to know which. The challenges we are faced with are not only to understand about outcomes and their determinants, which is formidable enough, but also to assess routinely knowledge on the quality of life and functioning from a patient's point of view. Most importantly, the main challenge is to create a decision making environment which is capable of optimally using reliable information on and data about patient outcomes.
(6) Conclusions The evidence for common uncertainties in clinical practice is overwhelming and, clearly, important carving away at key parts of it is the dominant component of Archie Cochrane's legacy. I have sought to draw attention to some of the potential problems in priority setting and in the evaluation of treatments, where I believe that some of the observational methodology proposed is, in principle, cheap and could be routine. It is not so cheap now because one has to develop mechanisms not already in existence to capture all cases and to allow useful follow up of outcome as well as to attract the collaboration of clinicians. It cannot replace randomised controlled trials except in circumstances where the attribution of cause with respect to outcome is unambiguous, and this will sometimes happen. We will have to get better at determining the causes of observed differences by knowing about the potency of plausible confounders.39 What I am proposing is systematic study of enormous numbers of cases so that even rare and long term outcomes can be systematically compared. CRITERION 
